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A SUGGESTED TREATMENT OF SPIN-OFF
REORGANIZATIONS
A spin-off reorganization occurs when Corporation A organizes a
subsidiary, Corporation B, to which it transfers part of its assets in
exchange for all the capital stock of B. B's stock is then distributed to
A's shareholders without their surrender of stock in A., After distribu-
tion of the controlled corporation's stock, the shareholders of the dis-
tributing corporation own stock in two independent companies. The
distribution may be tax-free under Section 355 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,2 which provides that if the transaction is not used
principally as a device to distribute earnings and profits, and if certain
other requirements are met,3 the distribution of stock to the share-
holders results in no recognition of gain or loss to them, assuming that
no "boot" is distributed.4
The requirements of section 355 foreclose the otherwise tempting
opportunity to transform dividend income into capital gain by trans-
ferring a company's liquid assets to a newly formed company and then
liquidating the new company or selling its stock. Section 355 therefore
attempts to preclude tax considerations from impeding business re-
I A split-off is similar to a spin-off, except that 'the shareholders surrender part of
their stock in the parent corporation in exchange for stock in the subsidiary. In a split-up,
the parent corporation transfers substantially all its assets to two or more corporations
and then liquidates, its shareholders surrendering all of their stock in the parent and
receiving the stock of the transferee corporations. When the distributing corporation
transfers assets to the controlled corporation and then distributes the stock received in
exchange, there is a reorganization under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a)(1)(D). Thus, the
transferor corporation recognizes .no gain or loss on the transfer under § 361(a), and,
under § 362(b), the transferor's basis in the assets carries over to the transferee corpora-
tion. Unlike pre-1954 law, however, § 555 also encompasses non-reorganization spin-offs
that involve only a distribution of the stock of an existing subsidiary corporation. This
Note discusses only spin-offs that constitute Type ) reorganizations.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all textual references to section numbers and the "Code"
relate to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
3 In addition to the general proscription of "devices," § 355 requires that (1) im-
mediately before the distribution to the shareholders, the distributing corporation must
"control" the corporation whose shares or securities are being distributed, id. § 355(a)(1)
(A); (2) after the distribution, both corporations must be engaged in the active conduct
of a trade or business that was actively conducted during the five-year period prior to the
separation or acquired during that period in a tax-free transaction, id. § 355(b)(2); and
(3) all of the controlled corporation's stock, or at least an amount constituting "control"
within § 568(c), must be distributed to the shareholders, id. § 355(a)(1)(D).
0 Treas. Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(3) (1955) provides that the shareholder-distributee's basis
after the distribution (assuming no boot is distributed) is the aggregate basis of his orig-
inal stock and securities, allocated among the distributed and retained stock and securities
in proportion to their respective market values.
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organizations that are motivated by legitimate business reasons and
are not aimed at avoiding taxes.5 Ordinary income must be recognized,
however, when the corporate separation is part of a plan that is, in
effect, a dividend distribution. But when the change in corporate or-
ganization is essentially a change in form only, the shareholders do not
receive any additional economic interest from the stock distributions;
they merely divide their investment among several corporate entities.
As long as the assets remain in "corporate solution," and no subsequent
disqualifying event occurs (such as a liquidation by one of the corpora-
tions or a sale of the distributed stock) the incidence of taxation is
deferred.7
To qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 355, spin-
off transactions must now meet more rigorous conditions than existed
under pre-1954 law. The Revenue Act of 1951 permitted tax-free treat-
ment if two conditions were satisfied: first, each corporation involved
must have intended to continue the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness after the separation; second, the transaction must not have been
used principally as a "device" for distributing the earnings and profits
of either corporation.8 These two qualifications are retained as corner-
stones of the present section, but 355 has complicated the law by
adding an eighty-percent-control test and the five-year business history
rules.9 The ostensible purpose of the additional requirements was to
5 See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 57-58 (1951).
6 See Mintz, Corporate Separations, 36 TAxaS 883 (1958).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(c) (1955) provides in part:
Section 355 contemplates a continuity of the entire business enterprise under
modified corporate forms and a continuity of interest in all or part of such busi-
ness enterprise on the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the
owners of the enterprise prior to the distribution ....
8 Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 317(a)(11), 65 Stat. 493. The 1951 Act restored tax-
free treatment after spin-offs had suffered from more than a decade of Congressional
disfavor. The Revenue Act of 1934 had treated all spin-off distributions as dividends in
reaction to the well-known case of Gregory v. Helvering, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), rev'd, 69
F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), where the taxpayer had transferred cash
and marketable securities of her wholly owned corporation to a newly formed corporation
in exchange for its stock, and then immediately liquidated the new corporation. The
Board of Tax Appeals had held that meticulous compliance with the statute was suffi-
cient to convey unintended capital gains treatment, and Congress attempted to close this
bailout loophole by denying tax-free treatment to spin-offs. This turned out to be unneces-
sary, however, since the Supreme Court later reversed, holding that qualifying corporate
separations must be motivated by a valid business purpose rather than an intent to avoid
tax. The two conditions of the 1951 Act were inspired by the Gregory case.
9 INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)(1)(D) requires that if the distributing corporation
does not distribute all of the controlled corporation's stock that it holds immediately
prior to the distribution, then it must distribute 80% control within the meaning of
§ 568(c), provided that the Secretary's approval has been obtained. Section 355(b)(2)(B) re-
quires that the business of each corporation must have been actively conducted for five
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implement the pre-1954 non-device test and post-distribution active
business test, as well as the business-purpose and continuity-of-interest
tests which apply to all types of reorganizations. 1° A question arises
whether the technical conditions for qualification leave enough room
for flexible application when basic reorganization doctrines are satis-
fied. A spin-off of the non-California assets of Pacific Telephone Co.,
which has produced a split between the Ninth and Second Circuits,
provides a convenient vehicle for analyzing this question.
I
THE PACIFIC REORGANIZATION: Baan AND Gordon
For several business reasons,1' Pacific Telephone Company decided
in 1961 to transfer its telephone communications business in Oregon,
Washington, and Idaho to a separate corporation, and formed Pacific
Northwest Bell Telephone Company (Northwest) for this purpose.
Pacific transferred all its non-California assets and liabilities to North-
west, together with $110,000 cash, in exchange for all the shares of
Northwest and an interest-bearing demand note for $200 million.
Pacific then issued to each shareholder one transferable stock purchase
warrant of Northwest for each share of Pacific he held.12 The distribu-
tion plan required six stock rights plus a payment of sixteen dollars in
exchange for one share of Northwest stock. The plan required Pacific to
offer to its shareholders the right to purchase all Northwest stock on a
years prior to the distribution. Section 355(b)(2)(C) requires that neither business can have
been acquired during the five-year period in a taxable transaction. Section 855(b)(2)(D) re-
quires that control of any other corporation that was conducting either business must not
have been acquired, directly or indirectly, in a taxable transaction.
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
11 Among the reasons given for the separation were the size of the geographical area
served by the company, the rapidly growing demand for telephone service, efficiency of
operations, the need for closer relations with the public and its employees, and Pacific's
desire for greater freedom to concentrate on California operations. Although these "busi-
ness reasons" by no means make it obvious, the courts apparently assumed that Pacific
could not have solved its problems as well by forming a separate division or subsidiary. One
court has held that there must be valid business reasons for both the separation and the
direct ownership of both corporations by the shareholders. Parshelsky's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 803 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Bonsall v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 61
(2d Cir. 1963). But see Cohen, Current Partial Liquidation and Spin-off Problems, 41
TAxEs 775, 777-79 (1963), for the view that this aspect of Parshelsky will have to be applied
flexibly by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts.
12 Pacific retained the $200 million note of Northwest. Although the language of §
355(a)(1)(D)(ii) does not expressly authorize it, Treas. Reg. § 1.855-2(d) (1955) provides
that securities may be retained.
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pro rata basis. Any stock not purchased could be acquired by Pacific's
parent company, AT&T, which owned 89.62 percent of Pacific's total
voting shares. The plan left to the discretion of Pacific's management
such matters as how many offerings of Northwest stock would be made
before it was all distributed, when the offerings would be made, and at
what price the Northwest shares would be offered to the shareholders. 13
The initial offering in 1961 distributed fifty-seven percent of the North-
west stock in exchange for six rights and sixteen dollars, at a time when
the market value of the shares was twenty-six dollars. In 1963 the re-
maining forty-three percent was distributed for eight rights and sixteen
dollars. In neither year did the distributee shareholders report as income
any amount with respect to the issuance of the rights or the distribution
of the stock. The Commissioner determined that the difference between
the fair market value of the Northwest stock (twenty-six dollars) and
the sixteen dollars per share paid constituted a taxable dividend under
section 301.14 The issue was contested first in the Tax Court in Oscar
E. Baan'15 and then in the Second and Ninth Circuits in Commissioner
v. Gordon'1 and Commissioner v. Baan.Y'
In the Tax Court and in both circuits of the court of appeals, the
Commissioner made the following contentions:
(1) The five-year business history test of section 355(b)(2)(C) was
not met.
(2) Pacific's three-year plan did not meet the distribution re-
quirements of section 355(a)(1)(D).
(3) Pacific's use of stock rights and sixteen dollars cash considera-
tion failed to meet the requirements of section 355(a)(1)(A) that
"solely stock" be distributed "with respect to ... stock."
A. Five-Year Business History Test
Under section 355(b)(2)(C), a corporation is considered actively
engaged in business after the distribution only if its business was not
acquired within the preceding five-year period in a transaction in which
13 These decisions were to be made according to the capital requirements of Pacific,
but a letter sent to Pacific shareholders stated that the management anticipated complete
distribution within three years.
14 Section 356(b) provides:
If-(I) section 355 would apply to a distribution but for the fact that (2) the
property received in the distribution consists not only of property permitted by
section 355 to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other prop-
erty or money, then an amount equal to the sum of such money and the fair
market value of such other property shall be treated as a distribution of property
to which section 301 applies.
15 45 T.C. 71 (1965).
16 382 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1033 (1968).
17 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1034 (1968).
1968] SPIN-OFFS
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
gain or loss was recognized in whole or part. The Commissioner claimed
that Pacific had acquired Northwest's business in a taxable transaction
within the previous five years, since Northwest issued a demand note
along with its stock, and that the note was "other property" within
section 361(b).18 According to section 355(a)(3), the Commissioner's
view would make all of the stock distributed to the shareholders "other
property" taxable as a dividend under section 356(b). The taxpayers
argued that the note was a "security," which can be received without
recognition of gain under 351(a) or 361(a). But the Tax Court declined
to decide whether the note was "boot"; since the note was received in
an inter-company transfer between members of an affiliated group
of corporations filing a consolidated return, no gain would be recog..
nized in any event because of the then-applicable consolidated return
regulations. 19 Thus, any gain resulting from the transfer of business
assets that might otherwise be subject to tax was eliminated under the
consolidated return regulations.20
The Commissioner argued that the Regulations merely provide
for the elimination of gain, while section 355 requires nonrecognition.
The Tax Court, however, refused to accept this distinction.21 The issue
was not resolved on appeal to the Second Circuit, perhaps because the
applicable regulations had become obsolete. 22 The court instead ap-
proached the problem by applying its view of the purpose of the active
business requirements of section 355(b)-the prevention of temporary
investment of liquid assets in a new business or the purchase of a new
business.2 The five-year period, said the court, merely reduced the
incentive to distribute the stock in place of a dividend. In this case,
18 This section provides in part:
If subsection (a) [no gain or loss on an exchange of property for stock between
corporate parties to a reorganization] would apply to an exchange but for the
fact that the property received .. . consists not only of stock or securities .. .
but also of other property or money, then ... (B) if the corporation receiving
such other property or money does not distribute it. . . the gain, if any, to the
corporation shall be recognized ....
19 Treas. Reg § 1.1502-31(b)(I)(i) (1955).
20 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 93 (1965), rev'd, 382 F,2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 389 U.S. 1034 (1968), and aff'd sub nor. Commissioner v, Gordon, 382 F.2d 499
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1033 (1968).
21 It is doubtful that the Tax Court would reach the same result under the new
consolidated return regulations, which provide that intercompany transactions result in
a recognition of gain to the exchanging companies, with the gain merely deferred until
a subsequent event. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13(c),(h), Example (2) (1966).
22 Id. The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to consider the elimination-nonrecogni-
tion issue. Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 498 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1034 (1968).
23 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 267-68 (1954). See also Jacobs, The Anat-
omy of a Spin-off, 1967 DutxE L.J. 1, 17-18 (1967).
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it concluded, section 355(b)(2)(C) has no application since "no new
business, no new assets, and no new corporation was acquired at all."24
section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) had been satisfied,
B. Distribution of Control in a Single Offering
Section 355(a)(1)(D) provides that the distributing corporation
must distribute to its shareholders either all the stock or, with the
Secretary's approval, eighty percent of the voting and nonvoting stock
of the controlled corporation. The Commissioner argued that there is
an implied requirement in section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) that the distribution
of stock constituting control occur in a single offering to the share-
holders, and that this requirement was not met since Pacific's two
offerings were separated by almost two years.25 The Tax Court found
no single offering requirement, and adopted the view that as of 1968,
when more than eighty percent of the shares of Northwest had been
finally distributed to Pacific shareholders, the control requirement of
section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) had been satisfied.
The Second Circuit upheld the Tax Court's integrated transaction
approach. It said that the danger of periodic distributions of stock as
substitutes for dividends could adequately be prevented by the "device"
clause 26 and that any administrative difficulties presented by allowing
more than one distribution could be remedied by new regulations. 27
24 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 607 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1033 (1968). See Jacobs, supra note 23, at 18, for the view that when an acquisition
of a business meets the continuity-of-interest requirements applicable to reorganizations
generally, it should not be disqualified under § 355, even though there was some boot
received in the transaction that results in gain to the transferor corporation under
§ 361 or to its shareholders under § 356.
25 The Commissioner argued that § 355(a)(1)(D) was designed to prevent periodic
distributions of stock in the controlled corporation as a substitute for dividends and that
whether the distributing corporation has retained more than 20% of the stock is deter-
mined immediately after the first distribution transaction. The Commissioner cited a
number of administrative difficulties inherent in allowing more than a single distribution:
the tax result would be left open for several years, and it would be difficult to define the
"date of distribution" and to ascertain whether there was control "immediately before"
the distribution.
26 882 F-d at 508, citing Professor Bittker, who wrote that the presumable purpose
of the limitation on retention of stock and securities was to prevent periodic distribution
as a substitute for dividends, but that, as such, it overlaps and buttresses the "device"
clause of § 355(a)(1)(B). Bittker went on to say:
[1]t is not clear . . why periodic distributions of small amounts of the controlled
corporation's stock should be treated as a dividend, once the basic policy decision
to permit a tax-free distribution of all of its stock and securities under § 355 was
made.
B. BIrrrER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREOLDERS
479 (2d ed. 1966).
27 Nothing in our opinion prevents the Commissioner from drafting reasonable
1968] SPIN-OFFS
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Since Pacific had distributed only fifty-seven percent of the Northwest
stock after the initial offering, however, the Ninth Circuit held that
the requirements of section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) had not been met.28 Al-
though the court did not insist on immediate distribution, it took the
view that if control is to be transferred in two distributions, they
"must not extend over any greater period of time than is reasonably
necessary considering the practical problems involved in completing
such distributions." 29
C. Distribution "With Respect to Stock"
The Commissioner asserted that Pacific had not met the require-
ment of section 355(a)(1)(A)30 in that Pacific did not distribute the
Northwest shares "with respect to its stock." His contention was that
the sixteen dollar cash payment required of Pacific shareholders took
the transaction out of the subsection, since the phrase "distributes ...
with respect to ... stock" is used in the Code only to refer to distribu-
tions without consideration.31 The Tax Court rejected this argument
and, rather than finding a sale for cash consideration, treated the six-
teen dollar payment as a contribution to capital required as a condi-
tion to receiving the stock.82
Regulations limiting the time period within which the entire distribution must
be made, or the number of transactions which may be involved, or specifying
what advance notice must be provided the Service, or defining the statutory
language .... But we are not prepared to apply retrospectively restrictions di-
rected at evils which this case does not present.
Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1033
(1968).
28 "[Flulfillment of the control requisite is to be adjudged as of the date of the initial
distribution rather than by recourse to hindsight in each case after the transaction has
been fully consummated." Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 495 n.17 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1034 (1968).
29 Id. at 498.
80 "(1) GENERAL RuLE.-If-(A) a corporation . . . (i) distributes to a shareholder,
with respect to its stock . . . solely stock or securities of a corporation . . . which it
controls immediately before the distribution .... ".INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 355(a)
(emphasis added).
81 See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301 (distribution of property), 305 (distributions of
stock and stock rights), 807 (basis of stock and stock rights acquired in distributions), 311
(taxability of corporations on distributions), and 312 (effect of a distribution on corporate
earnings and profits).
32 [S]ection 355 was intended to permit the receipt of such stock without tax even
where the recipient paid nothing therefor, and . . . it would be a distortion of
congressional purpose to impute an intention to impose the tax where the recip-
ient was required in effect to contribute to the capital of the distributing corpora-
tion as a condition to receiving the distributed stock.
Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71,,91 (1965), rev'd, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389
U.S. 1034 (1968), and aff'd sub noma. Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. granted, 389 US. 1033 (1968).
The Second Circuit, though it agreed that the payment might be
treated as a contribution to capital, preferred to hold for the taxpayers
on the ground that, while the Code does not contemplate receipt of
cash by a corporation in connection with a distribution, it does not
prohibit such a transaction from falling within section 355. The court
rejected the Commissioner's argument that the use of transferable stock
rights plus the sixteen dollar cash payment requirement was likely to
diminish continuity of ownership, by saying that continuity of interest
is measured by what actually happened rather than by what might
have happened. 33 Pointing out that over ninety-five percent of the share-
holders exercised stock rights, the court concluded that the continuity
requirement had been met.
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, accepted the Commis-
sioner's argument that the use of stock rights with a requirement of cash
payment might undermine continuity of interest. The Court again
viewed the transaction prospectively, reasoning that upon the adoption
of such a plan, it is conceivable that a substantial number of share-
holders would choose to sell their stock rights rather than make the
necessary cash payment.84 The Ninth Circuit's holding seems unduly
harsh, however, in view of Revenue Ruling 66-23,35 in which the Service
took the view that the continuity of interest requirements of the re-
organization provisions are satisfied if the shareholder at the time of the
reorganization has no preconceived plan or arrangement for disposing
of the stock received.30
33 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 506 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1033 (1968).
34 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 495 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1034 (1968).
35 1966-1 Cuu,. BuLL. 67. See Chester E. Spangler, 18 T.C. 976 (1952), acquiesced in,
1953-1 Cuvt. BuLL. 6, where a split-off was held tax-free under the 1939 Code, even though
the distributees sold the stock of both corporations after the distribution, because the Tax
Court found that before the distribution they did not intend to make such a sale. Accord,
Rena B. Farr, 24 T.C. 350 (1955). See B. Brrraxa & J. EusnTc, supra note 26, at 474 n.36.
Presumably a non-prearranged sale of stock after the distribution that is not an integral
part of the plan of reorganization would not run afoul of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368
(a)(1)(D), which requires that 80% control of the transferee corporation exist "immediately
after" the transfer. Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479, 489-90 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 310 US. 650 (1940), held that the identical requirement in Revenue Act of 1928,
ch. 852, § 112(b)(5), 45 Stat. 816 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351), is satisfied even if the
shareholders have control only momentarily.
36 The Ninth Circuit's approach is impractical, since guessing at each shareholder's
intentions is fruitless, especially when the distributing corporation is large and its stock
is widely held. A representation of intention with respect to controlling shareholders, how-
ever, should be sufficient to satisfy Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 67.
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D. Distribution of "Solely Stock or Securities"
The Commissioner argued that the distribution of stock rights
is not exempt from recognition of gain, since section 355(a)(1)(A)3 7
permits only stock or securities to qualify for the exemption. The Tax
Court felt that this technical reading of the statute failed to give effect
to the basic congressional objective, and that the term "stock," as used
in section 355, is sufficiently broad to encompass stock rights.
38
The Second Circuit also rejected the Commissioner's argument,
but on the ground that the stock rights were only a device to accom-
plish the important event, distribution of the stock.39 The Ninth
Circuit followed the view of the Regulations40 and held that stock rights
are not stock or securities within section 355(a)(1)(A) but only options
to purchase stock. The court added that, since section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii)
incorporates the "control" definition of section 368(c), the "stock or
securities" distributed by the parent must carry voting rights, which
stock rights do not carry.41
II
FLExIBLE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 355-A RATIONALE
Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,42 the appropriate-
ness of either a flexible or a strict application of section 355 should
soon be resolved. 43 The Supreme Court will face a conflict between, on
87 Quoted in note 30 supra.
38 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 90-91 (1965), rev'd, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 389 U.S. 1034 (1968), and affd sub nom. Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1033 (1968).
39 A sale or exchange of a stock right prior to exercise results in a tax only be-
cause it is an anticipation of gain from an exercise. It follows in this case that
it is the actual distribution of the Northwest stock upon the exercise of the rights
that is the relevant event and the use of the stock rights as a mere mechanism to
accomplish this result should be disregarded.
Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 500 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1033
(1968).
40 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1955) states that "[flor the purpose of section 355, stock
rights or stock warrants are not included in the term 'stock and securities."'
41 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1034 (1968).
42 Commissioner v. Gordon, 389 U.S. 1034 (1968); Commissioner v. Baan, 389 U.S.
1034 (1968).
43 The 1966 consolidated return regulations would prevent a corporation like Pacific
from distributing stock and securities tax-free under § 355 within five years after the
transfer of assets, if, like Pacific, it received in such transfer "other property" such as
Northwest's demand note. See note 21 supra. If, however, the Supreme Court should up-
hold the flexible approach of the Second Circuit to the Pacific transaction, companies
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one hand, the congressional desire to encourage business-motivated
corporate separations, and, on the other hand, the aim of asserting
ordinary income tax at the shareholder level, when the separation is
merely a step in a plan of sale or liquidation and thus resembles a
dividend.44 Several factors support the strict construction of the Ninth
Circuit. The spin-off device creates great potential for converting
ordinary income into capital gain, and, therefore, clearly defined rules
should govern its availability to a corporation seeking nonrecognition
treatment for its shareholders. Rigidly applied tests have the farther
advantage of providing reliable guidelines that the Service and the
taxpaying public can more easily apply. The courts would similarly
benefit, since rigidly applied tests would lessen the need for case-by-case
analysis of taxpayers' motives.45
There are more convincing reasons, however, for adopting the
flexible approach of the Second Circuit in Gordon. The history of
divisive reorganizations under the Internal Revenue Code demonstrates
that the basic policy of the present section is nonrecognition of gain or
loss in bona fide corporate divisions. Pre-1954 law allowed a tax-free
spin-off when the spin-off was effectuated for legitimate business reasons,
corporate assets remained in the corporate form, ownership of the two
surviving corporations remained substantially the same, the business
objective was that both corporations would continue in active business,
and the transaction as a whole was not a "device" to avoid income tax.
Since the subsequently-added five-year active business history test and
the eighty-percent-control test were intended to implement pre-355
policies, they should not be permitted to supplant them by inflexible
application in cases where the more general doctrines indicate that
nonrecognition treatment is appropriate.
A. "Devices"
The elusive "device" concept, which has been carried over from
the 1939 Code, has not been defined dearly by either Congress or the
courts. The most flagrant example of a device is a spin-off followed by
a sale of either corporation's stock pursuant to an agreement made
contemplating a spin-off of assets would have a convenient method of raising capital
without issuing additional stock or securities.
44 See Mintz, supra note 6.
45 The advantage to the judiciary of rigid rules may only be illusory, however, since
the "device" clause of § 355(a)(1)(B) necessitates such investigation by the court even in
cases where the five-year active business history rules and the 80o-control test have been
adhered to. Cf. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), where the taxpayer met every
element of the then-current statutory reorganization statute, but the court went on to find
that the transaction could not qualify because of lack of a valid business purpose.
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before the separation. In such a case, section 355(a)(1)(B) expressly pro-
hibits the shareholders from obtaining nonrecognition treatment.
When there is no pre-transaction agreement, the statute excludes the
transaction from the "automatic device" class,46 but the Regulations
provide that a subsequent sale will be evidence that the transaction is
a device.47 Whether mere negotiations for sale will be fatal "shall be
determined from all the facts and circumstances." 48 Consideration is
also given to the "nature, kind and amount of the assets of both corpora-
tions" after the spin-off, and the fact that all the assets of each have been
used actively in business for five years is positive evidence that no
device exists. 49 The "device" issue tends to prevent shareholders from
liquidating part of their investment as an element of the divisive
transaction, 0 and therefore serves to insure continuity of interest.51
The device clause can also result in denial of nonrecognition treat-
ment when no sale occurs, because of the attention it focuses on the
nature of each corporation's assets after the separation. Thus, when
substantial unneeded liquid assets are transferred to the controlled
corporation, or when a corporation with substantial liquid assets spins
some assets off to a subsidiary, the device clause will likely be invoked.
The more technical requirements of section 355 give further
body to the device clause. The five-year business history rule prevents
a corporation from investing its excess liquid assets in a new business
and then spinning it off for subsequent liquidation by the shareholders.
The active-business rule prevents a corporation from separating its
working assets from its investment assets and excess cash in contempla-
tion of such a scheme. The eighty-percent-control test prevents periodic
distribution of stock as a substitute for dividends 2 and contains its own
46 See Marne S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914 (1964), reo'd on other grounds (no business
purpose), 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965), where a spin-off of credit and collection assets
from a retail furniture business was not a "device," because the shareholders continued
both corporations in active business and had no intention of liquidating or selling the new
corporation.
47 Treas. Reg. § 1.855-2(b) (1955).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 This is especially true if the dividend history of the distributing corporation sug-
gests that the spin-off distribution is a belated substitute for a dividend.
51. See B. BirrK & J. EusTicE, supra note 26, at 477, for the view that when a spin-off
is followed by a statutory merger of another corporation with either the distributing or
the controlled corporation, neither the "device" clause nor the continuity-of-interest doc-
trine is violated, since the assets remain in corporate solution, no earnings or profits are
distributed, and the original shareholders retain a continuing interest in the surviving
corporation. This view would produce a result contrary to that reached in Curtis v. United
States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
52 See B. BrrrKER & J. EUsTicE, supra note 26, for the view that this "purpose" is of
questionable validity.
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"device" clause. Thus, while the other spin-off requirements provide
separate tests, all of which must be satisfied,53 there is a good deal of
interplay between them and the "device" concept. Even when the more
technical requirements of section 355 are satisfied, every spin-off is
potentially a "device," in that after some lapse of time the shareholders
have an opportunity to sell or liquidate and enjoy corporate earnings
at capital gains rates. The more general "device" clause of section
355(a)(1)(B) allows courts ultimately to determine whether the assets
have remained in corporate form, with ownership remaining in the
same hands. If the device test and its related concepts are resolved in
favor of the shareholders, courts should apply the additional technical
conditions of section 355 with a flexible attitude.
B. Number of Distributions Required
Another problem concerning stock distribution arises from the
Commissioner's argument based on section 355(a)(l)(D) 54 that the
stock of the controlled corporation must be transferred to the share-
holders in a single distribution.5, According to the Commissioner this
requirement is necessary in order to determine whether the distributing
corporation had the requisite eighty percent control "immediately
before" the distribution. This contention, taken with the refusal of the
Commissioner and the Ninth Circuit56 to view the effect of the whole
transaction rather than mere isolated distributions, is an unnecessarily
rigid construction of the statute when the transaction presents no
problem with business purpose, continuity, or a device.
Several cases under section 351(a), which allows nonrecognition
treatment for transfers to a corporation of which the transferors have
eighty percent control "immediately after" the exchange of property
for stock, provide examples of the flexible approach. 57 In James C.
53 See Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1965), holding that the
business purpose requirement cannot be satisfied merely by showing no tax-avoidance
motive.
54 The section provides in part:
(D) as part of the distribution, the distributing corporation distributes--
(ii) an amount of stock in the controlled corporation constituting control
within the meaning of section 868(c), and it is established ... that the retention
by the distributing corporation ... was not in pursuance of a plan having as one
of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income tax ....
55 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 496 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1034
(1968); Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 507 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1033 (1968).
56 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 498 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1034 (1968).
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (1955) provides:
The phrase "immediately after the exchange" does not necessarily require simul-
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L-amrick,58 the taxpayer invented an electric device, secured a patent,
and transferred the patent and borrowed capital to a corporation for
the purpose of marketing the invention. In exchange, the taxpayer was
to receive a portion of the company's stock and stock rights payable
in installments over a period of several years. The Tax Court rejected
the Commissioner's argument, similar to that made in the Baan59 and
Gordon6o cases, that the "immediately after" requirement was not met,
since the tax effect of the transaction could not be determined for a
period of several years.6 ' Hamrick seems to support the suggestion of the
Second Circuit in Gordon that any administrative difficulties created
by these prolonged transactions could be remedied by new regulations
providing for advance notice to the Service and limiting the number of
years in which the transactions may be completed.
6 2
The Service has already done essentially this in the area of Type
A, B, and C reorganizations.0 Several conditions are imposed on de-
layed issuance: all the stock must be issued within five years of the
initial transfer of assets or stock; there must be a valid business reason
for not issuing all the stock immediately; the maximum number of
shares that may be issued in the exchange must be stated in the ruling
request; the right to receive stock in the future cannot be assignable
or negotiable; and the additional stock to be received must be solely
that of the acquiring corporation.6 4 Similar requirements applied to
section 355 spin-offs would remedy the administrative difficulties cited
by the Commissioner in Baan and Gordon. A representation by the
distributing corporation, that conditions exist similar to those listed
taneous exchanges by two or more persons, but comprehends a situation where
the rights of the parties have been previously defined and the execution of the
agreement proceeds with an expedition consistent with orderly procedure.
58 43 T.C. 21 (1964).
59 Commissioner v. Baan, 382 F.2d 485, 496 (9th Cir. 1967) cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1034
(1968).
60 Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499, 507 (2d Cir. 1967) cert. granted, 389 U.S.
1033 (1968).
61 43 T.C. at 34. Another case in which the phrase "immediately after" was given
flexible construction is H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947 (1963), which involved § 355. In
that case, the parent corporation transferred to its newly-created subsidiary cash that was
used to purchase operating assets from the parent. The Tax Court rejected the Commis-
sioner's argument that temporary ownership of only cash by the subsidiary failed to meet
the "active business" requirements of § 355(b)(2). 40 T.C. at 959.
62 See note 27 supra.
63 In Rev. Proc. 66-34, § 3.03, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 1232, 1233-34, the Service announced:
"where the requisite stock or property has been acquired, it is not necessary that all of




above, would obviate the need to leave the tax result open for several
years, barring subsequent violation.
A court would have good reason, in addition, to apply the eighty-
percent-control test to the integrated transaction, as opposed to the
separate distributions, when the distributing corporation distributed
working control of the controlled corporation in the initial distribution.
This approach is somewhat related to that taken in the regulations
under the 1939 Code,6 5 which permitted a spin-off of the subsidiary
when the parent owned enough stock to give it working control of
the subsidiary.6 6 In adopting this position, a court would be recogniz-
ing the fact that the eighty percent figure is a convenient but arbitrary
rule of thumb, which in some situations has no relevance to whether
the purpose of the transaction is tax avoidance. Thus, when a parent
controls a forty- or fifty-percent-owned subsidiary and wishes to separate
for a reason that would be equally applicable if the subsidiary were
eighty-percent-owned (for example, to avoid antitrust litigation),67 the
parent could effect a tax-free separation under section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii)
only by first acquiring enough additional stock to meet the eighty
percent requirement in a tax-free stock-for-stock exchange under section
368(a)(1)(B). 6S If this is not possible, the parent is foreclosed from
effecting a tax-free separation.6 9
Another disparity in the eighty percent distribution requirement
is apparent from a comparison of a closely held corporation with a
publicly held corporation. Rigid adherence to the requirement in all
cases cannot be squared with its purpose, which presumably is to pre-
vent the distributee shareholders from selling their newly acquired
65 See Treas. Reg. 118, § 59.112(b)(1l)-2(b) (1953).
66 See Lyons, Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, TULANE 8TH ANN. TAX INST.
574, 609 (1959), suggesting an amendment to INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 355 that would
change the definition of control for purposes of qualifying a spin-off to conform to the
"working control" definition of the 1939 Code.
67 There would be no problem if the divestiture were made necessary by an anti-
trust order rendered by a court. INT. Rlv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1111, provides that in such case
receipt of divested stock by a noncorporate shareholder will not incur dividend treatment.
68 See Lyons, supra note 66, at 608.
69 Conceivably, the separation will not be tax-free even if the distributing corporation
acquires the requisite 80% stock ownership in the subsidiary. In Rev. Rul. 63-260, 1963-2
Cumt. BuLL. 147, the parent owned 70% of the subsidiary, and the additional 10% of sub-
sidiary stock was acquired as a contribution to capital by the parent's sole shareholder.
Tax-free treatment was not granted under § 355, because the parent was deemed not to
have "control" of the subsidiary "immediately before" the distribution "except in a transi-
tory and illusory sense." But see Rev. Rul. 56-117, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 180, in which the
controlled corporation was recapitalized immediately before the distribution to give the




shares while retaining control through their interest in the distributing
corporation. Thus, when a publicly held corporation retains less than
twenty percent of the subsidiary's stock, it still may have practical
control, and the purpose of the statute will be undermined unless the
transaction is prevented by the tax avoidance safeguard in section
355(a)(l)(D)(ii). Conversely, in the case of a closely held corporation,
retention of more than twenty percent would rarely violate the purpose
of the statute, since the stock of a closely held corporation is seldom
marketable unless a controlling block is offered for sale. Thus, when
the detached corporation is closely held, there is little need for strictly
interpreting the eighty percent requirement.70 Some of the more
advanced corporation laws have been drafted with a view to solving
problems peculiar to close corporations, 71 and it seems reasonable to
interpret tax laws in light of the differences between public and close
corporations.
C. Use of Stock Rights
Since the Regulations expressly proscribe the use of stock rights,72
it is much easier to argue for a flexible application of the eighty-percent-
control test and five-year business history tests than it is to equate stock
rights to "stock" in a spin-off transaction. And since the Code's defini-
tion of "stock" is inadequate for present purposes,78 one must look for
analogies in the tax law. Several sections of the Code expressly include
stock rights within "stock," 74 but, as the Hamrick case illustrated, these
sections are not exclusive, and a court would be free to interpret "stock"
as including stock rights in a spin-off situation. In Helvering v. South-
west Consolidated Corp.,75 a corporate taxpayer acquired the assets of
70 See Note, Divisive Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 67
YAIE L.J. 38, 55-56 (1957).
71 See, e.g., N. Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 401 (permitting merely one incorporator); 616(a)
(certificate of incorporation can provide for greater-than-majority of shareholders for
quorum and vote on transaction of business); 620(a) (permitting shareholder voting agree-
ments); 620(b) (certificate of incorporation can restrict authority of board of directors);
709(a) (certificate of incorporation can require greater-than-majority of directors for a
quorum); 1104(a) (certificate of incorporation can provide that 50% of the shareholders
can petition for dissolution) (McKinney 1963).
72 Treas, Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1955).
73 INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(7) provides: "The term 'stock' includes shares in
an association, joint-stock company, or insurance company."
74 E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 305 (distributions of stock and stock rights), 307
(basis of stock and stock rights acquired in distributions), 311(a) (taxability of corporation
on distribution of stock and stock rights), 312(d)(3) (effect of distributions of stock and
stock rights on earnings and profits), and 317(a) (stock and stock rights of distributing
corporation not included in the term "property" for purposes of the distribution).
75 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
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another corporation in exchange for its voting common stock and
stock warrants. The warrants carried the right to buy common stock at
specified prices that increased with time until the right expired. The
issue was whether stock warrants were comprehended within the
language of section 112(g)(1)(B) of the 1984 Act, which provided for a
tax-free reorganization when one corporation acquired the assets of
another corporation in exchange "solely for all or a part of its voting
stock."78 Apparently influenced by the fact that payment had to be
made upon exercise of the warrants, the Supreme Court held that the
words "solely for all or a part of its voting stock" must be read literally
and that the holder of the warrants possessed only contractual rights,
not an equity interest.77
The opposite result was reached in Carlberg v. United States, 78
where, under a merger plan, each shareholder of the two predecessor
corporations received in exchange for his stock a certificate for whole
shares of common, a fractional share of common, and a "Certificate of
Contingent Interest" in common shares that were reserved because of
the contingent liabilities of one of the corporations.- The plan contem-
plated the distribution of any reserved shares remaining after the
liabilities were resolved. The court held that the certificates were not
"boot" but rather true equity interests. Southwest Consolidated was
distinguished on the ground that here no payment or other positive
action was required of the certificate holders to obtain the reserved
shares. The court observed that the use of certificates was dictated by a
proper business exigency and that, like stock, they provided continuity
of interest. The opinion also pointed out that the certificates served as a
means of solving a practical problem faced by the parties: making
provision for potential liabilities and at the same time effecting a
statutory merger.7 9
Southwest Consolidated is strong authority for excluding North-
west's stock rights from the term "stock," because of the identical re-
78 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 227, § 112(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705.
77 315 U.S. at 200-01. The Southwest Consolidated case was followed recently by the
Tax Court in William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963). See also Turnbow v. Commissioner,
368 U.S. 337 (1961), where the Supreme Court strictly construed the "solely for stock"
requirement of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 112(g)(1)(B), 53 Stat. 40, for qualifica-
tion as a stock-for-stock reorganization. This strict approach to statutory language also
was applied in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966), where the Court stated that
"the words of statutes-including revenue acts-should be interpreted where possible in
their ordinary, everyday senses." The Court reached this conclusion, however, only after
deciding that "a literal reading of the statute is consistent with [its] legislative purpose."
Id. at 572.
78 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
79 Id. at 519.
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quirements in both cases of payment at the time of exercise. Also, the
Carlberg court felt the need to stress that there had been no payment.
On the other hand, a liberal construction of section 355, upholding
Pacific's use of stock rights, could find considerable support. Assuming,
as in Carlberg, that there is sufficient business purpose and continuity
of interest and no "device," the Supreme Court might uphold Pacific's
use of stock rights by analogizing to the "practical necessity" aspect of
Carlberg. Since Pacific's motive for the use of stock rights and cash
payments was to raise needed capital for its California operations,
which had been depleted by the transfer of assets to Northwest, its plan
was comparable to Carlberg's certificates and reserved shares as a method
to raise or retain needed capital for future contingencies. 80
Clearly, when stock rights are used in a spin-off plan as a means of
distributing earnings and profits, they should be disallowed under the
device provision of section 355(a)(1)(B). If the transaction is not used
principally as a device, however, there is no compelling reason why the
use of stock rights should not be permitted. That Pacific's stock rights
were transferable should not receive undue consideration on the issue
of continuity of interest, since transferability applies equally when stock
is issued directly. Like a sale of stock received in a stock dividend, a sale
of stock rights received as part of a section 355 transaction diminishes
the shareholder's percentage of equity ownership in the original cor-
porate assets. Moreover, the fact that some shareholders actually trans-
ferred some of their rights before the exercise deadline is of little
importance, since section 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) requires only eighty percent
continuity of interest, and ninety-five percent of the stock rights were
exercised by the original shareholders. Nor should transferability of the
stock rights be conclusive on the "device" issue, because a bailout of
earnings ordinarily means that a corporation's earnings and profits have
been drawn off without impairing a shareholder's interest in earning
power, growth potential, or voting control."'
D. Use of Cash Payments
Undue emphasis on the presence of stock rights obscures a more
crucial element of the transaction-the payment of cash consideration.
The distribution of the stock rights alone, under section 305, is probably
not a taxable distribution of property.82 But the required sixteen dollar
80 This approach was applied in James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21 (1964), where stock
rights were held to be "stock" for purposes of § 351. The Tax Court applied the Carlberg
principle and upheld the use of stock rights as the solution to a problem faced by the
transferor corporation at the time of the transfer.
81 See B. B rTmR & J. EusTicE, supra note 26, at 475.
82 Although the Commissioner argued in Gordon and Baan that the distribution of
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payment on exercise of the rights complicates the issue, since the ten
dollar difference between subscription price and market value makes
the transaction look like a disguised dividend. Nevertheless, the Com-
missioner's contention-that a "distribution with respect to stock"
cannot occur when there is a cash consideration paid-is not unassail-
able. A "bargain purchase," when corporate property is transferred to
shareholders pro rata at less than fair market value, is treated as a distri-
bution with respect to stock.8 3 Furthermore, the word "distributes" in
section 355(a)(1)(A)(i) arguably should be interpreted as broadly as the
word "distributes" in section 355(a)(1)(A)(ii), which obviously contem-
plates a distribution in exchange for other securities. When securities
are exchanged in a split-off transaction, gain is recognized to a share-
holder under section 356(d)(2)(C) only if the principal amount received
exceeds the principal amount surrendered. Perhaps the Tax Court in
Baan was analogizing to split-off treatment when it stated that there was
no congressional intention to tax a shareholder who, as part of the spin-
off plan, is required to contribute to the capital of the distributing
corporation as a condition to receiving the stock.8 4
The Second Circuit's view that the stock rights were used as a
"mechanism" for the ultimate distribution of stock has considerable
merit. Pacific chose the stock rights method rather than direct distribu-
tion of stock because it needed working capital for its California opera-
tions. Since a distributing corporation is permitted to transfer an
amount of liquid working capital to the controlled corporation based
on the reasonable and foreseeable needs of the controlled corporation,
there is no reason to prohibit the parent-distributing corporation from
raising sufficient additional capital to meet its own reasonable needs
without issuing further stock or debt securities. This view is under-
scored by the original purpose of section 355 and its predecessors-to
facilitate corporate separations that are motivated by legitimate nontax
business reasons by removing the hindrance of prohibitive taxation at
the shareholder level. This underlying policy should apply equally at
the corporate level. The tax law governing corporate separations should
not inhibit bona fide spin-offs by requiring a separate issuance of stock
or debt securities by a parent-distributing corporation that finds itself
short of operating capital.
the rights was a taxable event, the ruling letter issued prior to the spin-off stated that the
distribution of the rights would not result in tax to the shareholders. See Palmer v. Com-
missioner, 302 U.S. 63, 71 (1937).
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j) (1955), as amended, TD. 6752, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL. 84.
84 Oscar E. Baan, 45 T.C. 71, 90 (1965), rev'd, 382 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. granted,
389 U.S. 1034 (1968), and aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Gordon, 382 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1033 (1968).
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Although the new consolidated return regulations rule out the
future applicability of the specific facts of Baan and Gordon, the re,
mainder of the transaction (stock rights, cash payment, periodic distribu-
tions) may prove to be an important capital-raising device that would
serve the legitimate business needs of the taxpaying public. Whether
the Supreme Court or other courts will sanction it depends on their
willingness to adopt a flexible approach to section 355 rather than to
apply mechanically the somewhat artificial and arbitrary tests in the
statute.
CONCLUSION
With the exception of cases decided by the Ninth Circuit,8 5 courts
have tended to adopt a flexible approach to section 355 and to read its
terms broadly when the attempted spin-off transaction conforms to the
purpose of the section, i.e., has legitimate business purposes, continuity
of interest, and no tax-avoidance "device." Parshelsky's Estate v. Com-
missioners8 held that a "business purpose" of an individual shareholder
could support tax-free treatment as well as a corporate purpose. Coady
v. Commissioner87 held that the fact that section 355 requires each
corporation, after the distribution, to engage in an active business with
a five-year history, does not demand that each such business must be
conducted on an individual basis throughout the prior five-year period.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with Coady in United States v. Marett,88 rea-
soning that the Commissioner's pre-distribution two-business rule was
"an attempt to add a restriction to the statute which is not there."89 In
Lockwood's Estate v. Commissioner,90 the Eighth Circuit held that
when similar independent activities are commenced at a new location
without terminating activities at the old location, no new business has
been commenced for purposes of the five-year business history rules.91 In
Gabriel Fabrication Co.,9 2 the Tax Court held that section 355 does not
85 See, in addition to the Baan case, Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.
1965).
86 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962).
87 33 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'd, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961).
88 325 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1963).
89 Id. at 30. But see Lockwood's Estate v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965),
and Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964), in which the Commissioner unsuccessfully
argued that branch stores which had been separated from the main stores constituted
separate businesses and therefore lacked the requisite five-year business history.
90 350 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965).
91 See also Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021 (1964).
92 42 T.C. 545 (1964), acquiesced in, 1965-1 Cum BuLL. 4.
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require that the business conducted during the five-year period be
conducted by either the distributing or the controlled corporation, pro-
vided its acquisition was tax-free. I
In the Baan and Gordon cases, the Supreme Court should similarly
adopt a flexible approach to section 355. Although rigid application of
the statute would insure future disqualification of tax-avoidance ma-
nipulations, it would fail in the other, and equally important, purpose
of section 355-facilitating changes in corporate form when such
changes are motivated by business reasons other than tax avoidance.
Robert G. Parker
